Financing of industrial innovations in India : how effective are tax incentives for R&D? by Mani, Sunil
1Working Paper
405
FINANCING OF INDUSTRIAL
INNOVATIONS IN INDIA
HOW EFFECTIVE ARE TAX INCENTIVES
FOR R&D?
Sunil Mani
August  2008
2Working Papers  can be downloaded from the
 Centre’s website (www.cds.edu)
3FINANCING OF INDUSTRIAL  INNOVATIONS IN INDIA
HOW EFFECTIVE ARE TAX INCENTIVES FOR R&D?
Sunil Mani
August   2008
The initial discussions that I had with Pinaki Chakraborty were very
useful.  I received excellent help from M.Parameswaran for estimating
the coefficients of elasticity of R&D expenditure wrt tax foregone. An
initial version of the paper was presented as a lecture at the PGP-PMP
course at the Indian Institute of Management- Ahmedabad and at the
second conference of micro evidence on innovation in developing
economies at the Renmin University of China, Beijing. The comments
received from the participants and especially Pierre Mohnen is gratefully
acknowledged. I also received valuable comments from Professor
K. K. Subrahmanian. Research assistance was provided by Riju Prakash
J.S. But none of them are to be implicated for any errors that may still
remain.
4ABSTRACT
The paper surveys the instruments that are available for innovation
financing in India. It identifies three such instruments, namely research
grants and loans, venture capital and tax incentives. The effectiveness of
all these instruments are then examined in some general fashion, but
one of the instruments, namely tax incentives are subject to a detailed
empirical scrutiny in terms of its effectiveness. We have constructed a
dataset containing firm belonging to four different industries which have
claimed these tax incentives. For these firms we estimated the elasticity
of R&D expenditure wrt tax foregone.  The resulting analysis showed
that while the instruments have been targeted well at the right sort of
industries its effect in spurring additional investments in R&D is open to
question.
Key words: Public R&D support; R&D investment; Evaluation, Tax
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5Introduction
The government in India is on a major innovation drive like the
governments across the developing world and especially that of China.
This drive could be found in several policy measures enunciated over
the past ten years or so and especially in the Science and Technology
Policy of 2003, where in it is stated that the government targets the
expenditure on S&T to be about 2 per cent of GDP and this is to be
largely contributed by the industry through significant increases in
industrial R&D. Industrial R&D, therefore, may have to be incentivized
through the provision of a variety of fiscal incentives such as tax
incentives. This thinking again reflects the worldwide move toward using
non-interventionist, but market-friendly forms of increasing investments
in industrial R&D and within this scheme of things tax incentives form
an important instrument. In India, even as early as 2001, the existing tax
treatment of R&D had undergone some upward revisions, but targeted
more specifically at around eight high and medium technology based
industries. Although a few studies are available on the financing of
industrial innovation, with rare exceptions, most of these have been
descriptive, merely cataloguing the various schemes available for
encouraging investments in industrial R&D. However no analytical
studies on the effectiveness of these incentives in the specific Indian
context are available. This is significant as recent estimates by the Ministry
of Finance showed that the amount of corporate tax foregone consequent
to the tax treatment of R&D has been increasing at a rate of 2.4 per cent
per annum over the last four fiscal years until 2007-08: in 2004-5 about
Rs 23180 million of corporate tax revenue had been foregone as a result
of the operation of this scheme, but this is expected to be marginally
6down to about Rs 20240 million in 2007-08. It is seen that about 10 per
cent of the corporate income tax is foregone as a result of various tax
concessions of which R&D tax incentive is one such. In the context, the
purpose of the present study is to analyse the effectiveness of a specific
tax scheme that has been in operation since 2001. In very specific terms,
this is accomplished by computing the elasticity of industrial R&D
expenditure in India in response to a unit reduction in the cost of
performing R&D.  Such estimates of elasticity of R&D will be very
helpful in judging whether the tax incentive for R&D is effective in
stimulating proportionate investments in R&D.
The paper is structured into four sections. Section 1 analyses the
innovative performance of India by employing a number of conventional
and new indicators. The second section surveys the various financial
instruments that are available for financing of innovation. The third section
measures the effectiveness of tax incentives for financing R&D expenditures.
The fourth and final section sums up the main findings of the study and
identifies the policy conclusions that may emanate from this exercise.
I.  India's innovative performance : India is generally referred to
as an emerging knowledge superpower although her current record on
this issue is rather mixed. We seek to analyse this record by employing a
variety of conventional indicators as new indicators such as those
emanating from innovation surveys are not available in the Indian context
for the present.1 I consider three conventional indicators:
i. Trends in R&D investment;
ii. Trends in patenting;
iii. Trends in technology trade balance
1 The Department of Science and Technology (DST), Government of India is in
the process of conducting a pilot innovation survey by employing a CIS compliant
survey instrument. The results of this pilot survey may become available through
June 2008 and this is to inform a larger nation wide innovation survey to be
conducted during the latter half of 2008.
7To the extent possible, the analysis is conducted in a comparative
fashion by taking China as the comparator country.
Table 1:  Trends in R&D Investment, 1980-81 through 2003-04
(Rs in Millions)
Gross Expenditure on R & D (Rs. in Millions)
At Current At Constant Nominal Real GERD
Prices Prices growth Growth to GDP
(Base year rate (%) rate ratio
1993:94)
1980-81 7605.2 23421.6
1981-82 9407.3 26297.1 23.70 12.28 0.58
1982-83 12060.3 31175.4 28.20 18.55
1983-84 13811 32786.4 14.52 5.17
1984-85 17815.5 39386.3 29.00 20.13
1985-86 20687.8 42611.4 16.12 8.19 0.83
1986-87 24354 46868.1 17.72 9.99 0.88
1987-88 28530.7 50202.3 17.15 7.11 0.91
1988-89 33472.6 54345.1 17.32 8.25 0.9
1989-90 37257.4 55858 11.31 2.78 0.86
1990-91 39741.7 53972.4 6.67 -3.38 0.78
1991-92 45128.1 53867.9 13.55 -0.19 0.77
1992-93 50046 54947.8 10.90 2.00 0.79
1993-94 60730.2 60730.2 21.35 10.52 0.78
1994-95 66224.4 604253 9.05 -0.50 0.70
1995-96 74838.8 62634.4 13.01 3.66 0.70
1996-97 89136.1 69497 19.10 10.96 0.72
1997-98 106113.4 77507.6 19.05 11.53 0.76
1998-99 124731.7 84362.6 17.55 8.84 0.78
1999-00 143976 93751 15.43 11.13 0.82
2001-01 161988 101962.8 12.51 8.76 0.85
2001-02 170381.5 103720.9 5.18 1.72 0.82
2002-03 18000.6 105225.7 5.65 1.45 0.80
2003-04 197269.9 111989.3 9.59 6.43 0.78
Average rate of growth (pre reform) 18.17 8.91 0.81
Average rate of growth (post reform) 13.22 6.57 0.77
Source: Department of Science and Technology (2006)
Note: Pre reform refers to the period 1980-81 through 1990-91 and post
reform refers to the period 1991-92 through 2003-04; For the pre
reform period it is GERD to GNP ratio, but given the fact that in
India the ratio of GDP to GNP works out to unity, it does not
really matter whether one takes to ratio of GERD to GDP or GNP.
8The following inferences can be drawn from the above Table: (a)
Both in nominal and in real terms, there has been a decline in the overall
GERD; and (b) Even the GERD to GDP ratio too have declined during
the post reform period. From this, one has to be very cautious in drawing
any strong inferences about the innovative potential of the country. This
is because much of the overall R&D (GERD) of the country is performed
in the public sector in defense, space, atomic energy, health and
agriculture. Industrial R&D forms only about 20 per cent of the GERD.
However the share of the industrial sector has shown much increase
(Table 2) during the period.
Sector of Performance of R&D: See Table 2. In India much of
the R&D is actually performed by the government or public sector.
However the share of the business enterprises sector has shown some
sharp increases. It now accounts for about 20 per cent of the R&D. The
corresponding figure for China is as much as 69 per cent.  The higher
education sector represented by universities and research institutes
Table 2: Sector of performance of GERD in India, 1970-70 through
2004-05 (percentage shares)
Government Industry Higher Education
1970-71 89.55 10.45
1975-76 88.13 11.87
1980-81 84.13 15.87
1985-86 87.82 12.18
1990-91 86.16 13.84
1995-96 78.26 21.74
1998-99 75.79 21.17 3.04
1999-00 77.21 18.46 4.33
2000-01 77.94 18.05 4.02
2001-02 76.48 19.33 4.20
2002-03 75.56 20.27 4.17
2003-04 75.44 20.05 4.51
2004-05 73.92 19.81 4.88
Source: Department of Science and Technology (2006)
9accounts for only 5 per cent of total R&D performed in the country.
Notwithstanding the data problems, it is clear that the share of this sector
has only shown some slight increases during this period.
Growing Privatization of Industrial R&D: Mani (2007) had
shown that increasingly much of the industrial R&D is actually expended
by private sector enterprises. I extend this analysis to the most recent
period for which data are available (Table 3) and find that this is indeed
the case. An important hypothesis that  arises from these data (as contained
in Table 1 through 3), is that one sees a decline in the growth rate of
industrial R&D when increasingly that R&D is performed by private
sector enterprises. Does this mean that the private sector is experiencing
any Arrowian appropriability problems?.  This hypothesis makes the
study of external financing of industrial R&D in India a relevant one.
During this phase when investments in R&D are declining one sees that
the government is putting in place a number of financial support measures
that seeks to reverse this declining trend.  A study of the effectiveness of
these financial measures thus assumes much significance.
Industry-wide Distribution of R&D: Within the industrial sector
six industries (pharmaceutical, automotive, electrical and electronics,
chemicals and defence ) account for about two-thirds of the total industrial
R&D (Table 4). Among these various industries one just stands out from
the rest, namely the pharmaceutical industry as the industry alone
accounts for about 20 per cent of the total R&D expenditures. In fact,
later on I will show that even in the case of output indicators it is the
pharmaceutical industry that is the best. In short, it may not be incorrect
to say that India's national system of innovation is dominated by the
sectoral system of innovation of the pharmaceutical industry. Another
second in the line is the automotive industry. This industry is composed
of both the vehicle manufacturers and the auto parts sub sectors. Both
the industries are also characterised by competitive structures with a
number of foreign and domestic manufacturers co-existing and
10Table 3: Growing privatisation of industrial R&D in India, 1985-86 to 2002-03 (Rs in Millions at current prices)
Government Share of Private Sector
Public Sector Research Total Private Sector Industrial in Total Industrial
Enterprises Institutions government enterprises R & D Development
1 2 3 4 5 =  (3 + 4)
1985-86 1986.18 1622.7 3608.88 2519.44 6128.32 41.11
1986-87 2356.99 1723.36 4080.35 2916.33 6996.68 41.68
1987-88 2884.66 1851.29 4735.95 3102.67 7838.62 39.58
1988.89 3421.24 2093.28 5514.52 4176.25 9690.77 43.10
1989-90 4129.01 2395.21 6524.22 4905.94 11430.16 42.92
1990-91 4145.33 2491.88 6637.21 5499.81 12137.02 45.31
1991-92 4843.88 2745.50 7589.38 6369.44 13958.82 45.63
1992-93 5139.50 2993.65 8133.15 8362.47 16495.62 50.70
1993-94 5428.11 N.A. N.A. 9825.37
1994-95 4146.09 3564.00 7710.09 13188.70 20898.79 63.11
1995-96 4275.76 4116.99 8392.75 16270.69 24663.44 65.97
1996-97 5360.52 4440.00 9800.52 23307.50 33108.02 70.40
1997-98 5392.40 5641.30 11033.70 24382.50 35416.20 68.85
1998-99 6738.70 7133.20 13871.90 21781.10 35638.00 61.08
1999-00 7576.30 7808.82 15385.12 21781.10 37166.22 58.60
2000-01 8428.80 8641.20 17070.00 24114.00 41184.00 58.55
2001-02 7673.70 8922.60 16596.30 27874.80 44471.10 62.68
2002-03 8089.50 9512.50 17602.00 30649.30 48251.30 63.52
Source: Department of Science and Technology (2006)
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competing with each other. The auto parts subsector of the industry has
a rather high export intensity of nearly 20 per cent and this meant that
the subsector has been continuously investing in technology to upgrade
itself and meeting the technological challenges posed by its foreign
buyers.
Trends in Patenting
I consider both US and triadic patents secured by Indian inventors.
I start with the US patents. Among the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa) countries, India has registered the highest growth
rate in patenting (Table 5). From an earlier analysis (Mani, 2007), it is
seen most of the Indian patents are by domestic companies and that too
in the pharmaceutical area2. However in the more recent period, the
share of patents secured by affiliates of MNCs based in India is on the
increase.
Triadic patent data (patents secured by an inventor from three
different patent offices (namely the USPTO, European Patent Office and
Japanese Patent Office) also shows that India has registered one of the
highest growth rates in Triadic patent grants during the period 1975
through 1995.
The performance of the country in patenting thus confirms the
results obtained in R&D investments, namely that most of the patents
are secured by domestic private sector companies that too in the area of
pharmaceutical technologies.  In other words the patenting data further
supports the evidence that I found earlier in terms of India's innovation
system being dominated by the sectoral system of innovation of her
pharmaceutical industry.
2 Bulk of the US patents granted to Indian inventors are in two US patent classes
namely, in 532 Organic Compounds (includes Classes 532-570),  and in 424
Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions (includes Class 514).
12
Trends in Technology Trade Balance: India's technology trade balance
has been has been negative and rising all through the more recent years
(Table 5). However during the  period since 2005, it has turned positive
essentially due to the receipts under R&D outsourcing. India, along with
China has now become a major recipient of R&D outsourcing deals.
Most of India's R&D outsourcing deals is in the areas of pharmaceutical
and telecommunications industries.
Table 4: Industry-wide distribution R&D (cumulative share in per
cent 1998-99 through 2002-03)
Industry Share
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 19.30
Transportation 15.16
Electricals & Electronic Equipment 8.94
Chemicals (other than Fertilisers) 8.35
Defence Industries 8.32
Fuels 6.12
Information Technology 4.69
Metallurgical Industries 4.21
Telecommunications 3.75
Miscellaneous Industries 2.38
Soaps, Cosmetics & Toilet Preparations 2.37
Industrial Machinery 1.84
Biotechnology 1.59
Food Processing Industries 1.39
Agricultural Machinery 1.33
Misc. Mechanical Engineering Industries 1.22
Textiles (Dyed, Printed, Processed) 1.21
Consultancy Services 1.05
Other industries 6.77
Total 100.00
Source: Department of Science and Technology (2006)
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Table 5: Trends in US Patenting of Indian Inventors, 1994-2007 (number of utility patents)
Pre 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Compound
1994   rate of
growth
    China, P. Rep 431 48 62 46 62 72 90 119 195 289 297 404 402 661 772 23.82
South Africa 2390 101 123 111 101 115 110 111 120 113 112 100 87 109 82 -1.59
China, Hong Kong 701 57 86 88 81 160 155 179 237 233 276 311 283 308 338 14.67
India 428 27 37 35 47 85 112 131 178 249 342 363 384 481 546 26.02
Russian Federation 3 38 98 116 111 189 181 183 234 200 203 169 148 172 188 13.09
Brazil 752 60 63 63 62 74 91 98 110 96 130 106 77 121 90 3.17
Source:  USPTO (accessed on April 11, 2008)
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Thus, based on the evidence presented it can safely be concluded
that India's innovation performance has actually improved if one takes
the output measure of R&D. But the investments in R&D, both in the
country as a whole and in the industrial sector have actually declined.
Another point that came out of the analysis was that the country's
innovative performance is concentrated in certain specific industries such
as the pharmaceutical one and as such is not widespread. In fact we tend
to demonstrate that the government too has targeted this industry for
enhancing its innovative output by offering a variety of financial
incentives. In the following, we survey these various instruments for
financing innovation.
II. Survey of Instruments for Financing Innovations: The country
has three different types of financial arrangements for financing
innovations. They are: (i) Research grants; (i) Tax incentives; and (iii)
Venture capital. The former two are almost entirely provided by various
governmental agencies while the latter is now very much in the private
sector. Implicitly the innovation policy makers in the country has adopted
a linear view of innovation with three distinct phases: birth, survival and
growth phases.  All the research grants and venture capital are in the
Table 6: Trends in technology trade balance, 2000-2006
(in millions of US $)
Payments Adjusted Receipts Adjusted TBoP Adjusted
Payments Receipts TBoP
2000 311 54 -257
2001 236 60 -176
2002 361 22 -339
2003 352 23 -329
2004 444 32 -412
2005 712 1890 71 1709 -641 -181
2006 729 2514 729 5288 -600 2774
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birth phase of the innovation chain while the tax incentives are almost
entirely in the growth phase. See Figure 1. Although this might appear
to be a very idealistic picture from the financing of innovation point of
view with research grants and venture capital at the birth stage where
the market failures are great and tax incentives at the growth phase when
firms have established themselves and are in a position to engage in
formal intramural R&D activities, in actual operation the research grants
and venture capital financing does address only a small segment. Most
of the research grants are either addressed to public sector enterprises or
individual researchers. There are of course notable exceptions to this.
The venture capital in the industry although growing by leaps and bounds
is increasingly intertwined with the private equity industry and therefore
cannot be taken in its entirety as equivalent to technology financing.
With these caveats we attempt at a survey of the various instruments that
Figure 1: Financing of innovation in India (c2007)
Source: Dutz (2007)
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are available. The purpose here is to just map out the plethora of
instruments that are available for technology financing, actually available
in the country at present. In the next section, we take one of these namely
the tax instruments for some in depth examination in terms of its
effectiveness in driving up R&D investments.
We organise our discussion of these schemes into three broad areas
by type of instruments, namely (a) research grants; (b) venture capital;
and (c) tax incentives.
(a)   Research Grants: Under this we consider three grant or
loan schemes. They are: (i) Finances from the Technology Development
Board (TDB); (ii) Techno-entrepreneurs Promotion Programme (TePP);
and (iii) the New Millennium India Technology Leadership Initiative
(NMTLI).
(i)   TDB: The TDB was created by an Act of the Parliament in
1995 and commenced operation from 1996. TDB basically seeks to
support financially the commercialisation of indigenous technology
(whether obtained or developed from a publicly funded R&D or not,
including aspects such as improvements, modifications replacement of
imported inputs, conformance to domestic and global regulatory
standards, etc. and even for adapting and commercializing imported
technology that entail crucial modifications to suit domestic markets
and or further development of a ‘proof of concept or design’.  The TDB
provides financial support through: a) a loan of up to 50 per cent of the
project costs at simple interest (of 6% earlier and now lowered to 5%)
with repayment in five years after project completion (and a royalty
payment during the period of loan, which has now been dropped); b)
participation in equity of companies up to 25 per cent of paid up capital;
and c) Grants-in-aid. As of March 2005, TDB had supported around 141
projects with an estimated project cost of Rs.20450 million (of which
TDB sanctioned assistance is of around only Rs.6650 million). This
means that the TDB assistance works out to only a third of the total
17
project costs.  TDB has predominantly used the loan instrument for
support; it has participated in equity of only one company and given just
three grants-in-aid;. The grant of Rs 540 million by TDB to National
Aerospace Laboratories (NAL) for development and type certification
of a 14 seater aircraft is the largest project support ever made by TDB -
normally no private sector venture capital fund would have financed the
NAL development. TDB's reluctant use of equity as a mechanism for
support is a clear indication that it has been risk averse in funding start-
ups and new ventures.
The Health and Medical sector accounts for 25 per cent of TDB
funding followed by Engineering (15 per cent) and Road Transport (14
per cent).  Some successful projects supported by TDB are: development
and production of Hepatitis B vaccine (as a result of which the domestic
price has dropped to one tenth), Recombinant Streptokinase (second in
the world), corDECT, the Wireless in Local Loop access technology,
Bharat II variant of Indian car Indica, the first Indian electric vehicle
REVA and so on.
Hitherto there has been only one review of it in the first five years
of its operation- by the Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad
(ASC). The ASCI survey showed that around 50 per cent  of the
agreements were successful i.e., products released in the markets and
repayments to TDB commenced, another about 12 per cent were
foreclosed but payments were committed/received, 8 per cent were
failures and the rest about 20 per cent were those where success was
doubtful.  Of the successful projects, in over 70 per cent of the cases, the
technology originated outside of publicly funded R&D system.
(ii)  TePP: The programme was launched in 1998 to help realize
the vast latent innovative potential of individual innovators in the country.
The basic objective of TePP is for individual innovators to emerge as
technopreneurs - technology oriented entrepreneurs. TePP support is
provided for in all areas except software development for which there
18
are other avenues of support. It helps the inventor to identify and network
with an appropriate R&D/academic institution for guidance, technical
consultancy, development of models/prototypes, etc., assists in for filing
and securing of intellectual property rights and finally linking up with
appropriate source of finances for commercialisation of the product. TePP
by itself provides financial support of up to Rs.1 million as a grant-in-
aid to prove the idea and a similar amount for the second phase for
commercialisation.  Since its inception seven years ago, the programme
has received over 5500 applications of which around 1200 have been
assessed and of these, 207 projects supported.
(iii) NMTILI:  The scheme was announced at the dawn of the
Millennium in February 2000 by the then Finance Minister in his budget
speech of 2000. The objective was to catalyse innovation-centered
scientific and technological developments as a vehicle for select Indian
industry to attain a global leadership position. The state run Council of
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was assigned to manage the
scheme. The Scheme departed from the past practice and policy and
adopted a strategy of identifying, selecting and supporting technological
and industry winners. The Government funds the entire project (in most
cases) as a grant-in-aid for publicly funded R&D/academic partners and
as a soft loan (3 per cent simple interest payable in 10 installments) to
the industry partner and also underwrites the risk of failure.  Intellectual
property rights aspects are equitably managed - generally IPRs belong
to the group (s) developing it, which are licensed on a first right of refusal
basis to the industrial partner on mutually agreed terms with NMITLI
managers as the umpire.
During 2000-2006 period, it has funded 42 projects with an outlay
of about Rs.3000 million, involving 222 publicly funded R&D/academia
groups and 65 industrial firms as partners. Predominantly the projects
have been in the broad area of biotechnology (40 per cent) and in drugs
and pharmaceuticals and chemicals (15 percent each) - areas in which
CSIR has recognized core competencies.  NMITLI projects, which are
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wholly funded by the government, enjoy an average of about Rs.70
million project funding - highest of all government technology
development programmes. From the projects funded four products have
been developed, viz.,
– Biosuite,
– a versatile portable software for bioinformatics,
– a PC based high end 3D visualization platform for computational
biology;  and
– Sofcomp, a simple and cost effective office-computing platform
under Rs.10000 ($ 220 or so)
(b)   Venture capital:  The history of the venture capital industry
in India may be traced to 1988 when a few (mostly state owned) venture
capital funds were established on a loan from the World Bank. The
industry is now one of the fastest growing in the world and according to
some estimates the VC industry in India will overtake the UK one by
2009 or so. However increasingly the VC industry in India is only a small
portion of the total private equity industry: in fact its relative share has
gone down from 7 per cent in 2006 to about 4 per cent in 2007 although in
number terms it works out to about a quarter of all such deals.
Table 7: Share of Venture Capital in Total Private Equity Industry
in India, 2006 and 2007 (Value is in Rs Millions)
Number Number Value of Percent Value of Percent
of deals of deals deals share deals Share
2006 2007 2006 2007 2007 2007
Venture Capital 94 98 505 7.06 542 3.81
Growth PE 14 32 364 5.09 1321 9.28
Late 104 136 3396 47.46 5070 35.62
Pre IPO 4 14 43 0.60 434 3.05
PIPE 60 80 1401 19.58 4210 25.58
Buyout 13 7 370 5.17 173 1.22
Buyout-Large 1 3 765 10.69 474 3.33
Other 8 17 312 4.36 2010 14.12
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Much of the VC investments are in the Banking, Financial Services
and Insurance industries followed by telecom, IT and ITES sectors.
(c )  Tax incentives :  India offers a variety of tax incentives to
enterprises for committing resources to domestic R&D, both intramural
and extramural. They can broadly be classified into those which are input
based and those which are output based (Table 8). Of these two broad
categories, the input based ones are more popular. Within the input based
category although there are eight different types of tax incentives, the
one which has a long history and which enjoyed by maximum number
of companies is the one that provides a weighted deduction of 150 per
cent on any expenditure on intramural R&D (See A (a) in Table 8). This
has been in operation in its present form since 1998 and it applies to
about 10 different types of industries3  although the 9th and the 10th
industries (namely seeds and agricultural implements) were added only
in the latest budget for the fiscal year 2008-09.
This is not a permanent scheme and the incentives under this head
are available according to the term stipulated in the successive union
budgets. Given the fact that this is the most comprehensive tax scheme
for R&D, we undertake an analysis of its effectiveness.
 Table 8: Input and output based tax incentives for R&D in India
(c2008)
A. Input based tax incentives
a weighted deduction of 150 per cent on any
expenditure on in-house scientific research
(a) weighted tax deduction for sponsored research in
publicly funded R&D and on approved in-house
R & D projects;
3 The ten industries are pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, chemicals other than
pharmaceuticals, electronic equipment, computers, telecommunications
equipments, automobiles , auto parts, seeds and agricultural implements.
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(b) customs duty exemption on capital equipment, spares,
accessories and consumables imported for R & D by
approved R&D units, institutions and SIROs;
(c) excise duty waiver on indigenous items purchased
by approved institutions/ SIROs for R & D;
(d) accelerated depreciation allowance on plant and
machinery setup based on indigenous technology;
(e) customs duty exemption on imports for R & D
projects supported by the Government;
(f) ten year tax holiday for commercial R & D
companies; and
(g) a weighted deduction of 125 per cent on any payment
made to companies engaged in research and
development
B. Outcome based tax incentive
(h)  excise duty waiver for 3 years on goods produced
based on indigenously developed technologies and
duly patented in any two of the following countries:
India, European Union (one country), USA and
Japan.
Source: Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (2007); and
Ministry of Finance (2008)
III.  Effectiveness of R&D Tax Incentives in India:   An excellent
review of the evidence on effectiveness of tax incentives for R&D and
the methodologies used is found in Hall and Van Reenen (2000) and
Mohnen (2007). However much of this evidence is based on the
experience of OECD countries and notably that of the United States.
The authors both describe and criticize the methodologies used to evaluate
the effect of the tax system on R&D behaviour and the results from
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different studies. In the current (imperfect) state of knowledge Hall and
van Reenen conclude that a dollar in tax credit for R&D stimulates a
dollar of additional R&D. Studies on the effectiveness of tax incentives
in the context of developing countries are rare4.
The specific type of R&D tax incentive followed in India conforms
to those that are in proportion to the level of the expenses on R&D.
Further it manifests itself as an immediate write-off or expensing.
Within the specific context of India no such studies are available.
The government itself has been rather concerned with the revenue
foregone as a result of various tax concessions given to the corporate
sector. Consequently beginning with the Union Budget for 2004-05, the
government has been publishing data on the amount of tax revenue
foregone as a result of various tax incentives or concessions given to the
corporate sector. The revenue foregone as a result of R&D tax incentives
has been computed (by the Ministry of Finance) and this is presented in
Table 9.
4 There is a recent study evaluating the performance of R&D support programmes
in the context of Turkey. See Özçelika and Taymaz  (2008)
Table  9: Tax  foregone due to R & D tax incentives in India (Rs in
Millions)
  Column Revenue foregone  Growth Revenue forgone Share
due to R & D rate due to all tax (%)
incentives incentives
2004-05 2318 82680 2.80
2005-06 2839 22.48 101277 2.80
2006-07 1554 -45.26 144318 1.08
2007-08 2024 30.24 186125 1.09
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance (various issues)
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With the exception of 2005-06, it has averaged around Rs 2 billion
per year and works out to about 1.08 to 2.80 per cent of the total revenue
foregone. As result of the operation of these tax incentives the effective
corporate tax rate for some of the industries covered under the scheme is
significantly lower with the pharmaceutical industry garnering much of
the incentives (Table 10).
Table 10: Effective corporate income tax rate for those industries
covered under the R&D tax incentive scheme, 2006-07
Sl No Industry Statutory Effective
Corporate  Tax Rate
Income Tax  (in per cent)
Rate
 (in per cent)
1 Drugs and pharmaceuticals 33.66 13.91
2  Electronics, including
 computer hardware 33.66 17.04
3 Fertilizer, chemicals and Paints 33.66 22.17
4 Automobile and Auto parts 33.66 26.03
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance (2008), p. 59
Based on these, our hypothesis is that the effect of this tax
incentive will vary across industries according to the effective tax rate.
Although the incentive is same across the targeted 10 industries the
effective rate can vary according to whether the firms in the industry
has actually taken advantage of this scheme or not. Further it must
also be borne in mind that the effective rate is a function of the sum of
tax incentives enjoyed by a particular industry. It may be the fact that
the pharmaceutical industry also enjoys a number of other tax
concessions that their overall tax commitment is much lower than other
industries in our sample.
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In order to see whether the tax incentives have really lead to
increased investments in R&D, we do two exercises. Firstly, we compile
data5  on R&D expenditures of seven of the eight original industries
(Table 11). The only industry that is left out is the biotechnology industry
as the data on this industry are not available6. The growth rate of the
R&D expenditure of this sample is then compared with the growth rate
of the R&D investments of the entire private corporate business enterprise
sector (as contained in Table 3 above). The resulting analysis shows that
the average growth rate of the industries receiving tax incentives is much
higher than all the industries7  (with the sole exception of 2000- the
decline in R&D expenditure of all the firms enjoying R&D tax incentives
in that year may purely be a statistical artifact).
This of course does not mean that the incentive is effective. All
that it implies is that the government appears to have targeted the right
sort of industries for granting this concession. Secondly, we compute
the elasticity of R&D expenditure with respect to the tax foregone.
Although in its actual operation, the tax incentive does not lead to any
flow of resources from the government to the enterprise receiving the
incentive; it leads to tax foregone by the exchequer. If the percentage
change in the R&D is greater than the change in the tax foregone, the tax
incentive is deemed to have been successful provided that the tax incentive
accounts for a significant share of the R&D done by the enterprise. In
the following we do this sort of an exercise.
5 The data on R&D expenditures are compiled from the Prowess database of the
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), Mumbai.
6 We do not consider this as a major problem as much of the Indian biotechnology
industry is made up of the Biopharmaceutical industry and since we have the
data on R&D expenditures of the Pharmaceutical industry, the data on R&D
expenditures of the Biotechnology industry is included as well.
7 Even according to Table 4, the industries such as pharmaceuticals, automotive
and auto parts, chemicals other than pharmaceuticals, electronics and information
technology account for over 50 per cent of the total R&D expenditure of the
industrial sector as a whole.
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Table 11: R&D expenditure of firms receiving R&D tax incentives, 1996-2006 (Rs in Millions)
Industry 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Pharmaceutical 3954.1 7110.1 4627.3 6075 5674.7 7610.8 8937 11218.4 16609.5 22928.1 29595
Chemical Industry other 1997.8 4842.9 2377.2 3178.3 2275 2368.2 2094.9 2407.6 2697.1 3303 4791
than pharmaceutical
Electronics including 88.4 132.7 41.4 39.2 87.3 108 57.3 12.6 349.6 71.5 417.9
Computer
Communication Equipments 112.9 499.9 395.5 383.1 429 641.1 750.4 603.7 1025.1 896.3 727.4
Automobiles 1552.2 2459.6 2856 2143.8 1453.1 1742.9 2878.2 3357.9 4183 7506.9 8848.1
Auto parts 407.2 516 682.9 757.7 947.2 1081.7 1121.1 1485.7 1691.3 2194.6 2505.9
Aircrafts NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 2650.6 3091.4 3066.4 4336.2
Total 8112.6 15561.2 10980.3 12577.1 10866.3 13552.7 15838.9 21736.5 29647 39966.7 512215
Growth Rate (%) 91.82 -29.44 145.1 -13.6 24.72 16.87 37.23 36.39 34.81 28.16
Growth Rate of all Industries (%) 18.01 34.24 6.97 0.63 4.29 10.81 7.98 8.5
Ratio 5.1 -0.086 22.09 -21.72 5.77 1.56 4.67 4.28
Source:  Own compilation based on the Prowess database of Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE).
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Elasticity of R&D Expenditure to Tax Foregone
The first step involved in this exercise is to estimate the tax foregone
due to the operation of this specific R&D tax incentive scheme. This is
done in two stages. In the first stage or instance, we estimate the total tax
foregone (denoted as tf1) due to the operation of all tax incentives. This
is based on the difference between the statutory corporate income tax
rate and its effective rate (See the estimates of it in Table 10 above). Two
caveats have to be borne in mind. First, the estimates are available only
for four broad industry groups although it can be seen that it covers
almost 7 of the 8 industries receiving tax incentives.8   In the second
stage we estimate the tax foregone (denoted as tf2) due to just R&D tax
incentives alone. This estimation was done under an assumption. It was
found that the revenue foregone due to R&D tax incentives worked out,
on an average, 1.94 per cent of revenue foregone due to all kinds of tax
incentives (basing oneself on data contained in Table 9 above).  We,
therefore took 1.94 per cent of total tax foregone (tf1) to arrive at tax
foregone due to R&D tax incentives (tf2). In other words:
tf2 = tf1*0.0194----------------------------------------------------- (1)
For estimating the elasticity, we fitted the following functional form:
ln R & Dit = a+b1lnSalesit + b2tf2it + b3lnExport +uit ----------(2)
For the estimation of elasticity, we create a panel data of firms
reporting R&D expenditures in four of the broad industry groups for the
years 2002 through 2006. The data are taken from the Prowess database
published by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy. The unit of
reference is therefore the firms and the firms are arranged by any of the
four industries to which they belong. For each of the firms we have the
data on R&D investments, tf1, tf2, Profit before Tax, Sales and Exports.
8 The only industry that is left out is the aircraft industry.  The Prowess database
itself has started picking up data on R&D expenditure of this industry only
since 2003. See Table 11.
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Given the industry specificities we estimate (2) for each of the
four industries under consideration. Before going into the estimation
procedure for (2), we report the summary descriptive statistics of the
important variables. See Table 12.
Table 12:  Mean values of important variables
        (Values are in Rs Crores, Intensities are in percentages)
R & D Research Sales Tax Exports Subsidy
Expen- Intensity   foregone intensity
diture
Automotive 12.35 1.13 1088.42 1.653 87.95 13.50
(39.50) (2668.18) (4.299) (265.01)
Chemicals 2.07 0.46 449.24 0.133 55.61 6.43
(4.17) (151.04) (0.431) (137.43)
Electronics 7.4 2.41 306.58 0.218 40.71 2.95
(21.52) (289.69) (0.898) (151.04)
Pharmaceuticals 19.05 5.99 318.09 0.23 122.05 1.21
(52.91) (289.69) (0.43) (289.69)
Note:  (i) R&D intensity is R&D as a per cent of Sales; and (ii) Subsidy
intensity is Tax foregone 2 as a per cent of R&D; (iii) Figures in
parentheses indicate standard deviation.
Sales and exports are taken as additional determinants of R&D.
Sales is a proxy for the size of the firm and the assumption is that firms
with larger sales devote large amounts to R&D. Exports on the contrary
also encourages firms to commit more resources to R&D as sales in an
international market requires that your product matches with the best in
the world for that specific product. Further in the regression equation
(2) , the explanatory variable tf2 depends on the amount of R&D
spending. This implies that this explanatory variable is endogenous and
OLS estimates are not consistent. Therefore, we estimate the model using
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) as suggested by Blundel and
Bond (1998). In this method, the equation is first differenced to eliminate
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the firm specific fixed effect and endogenous variables are then
instrumented. The estimation uses two types of instruments; for equation
in differences lagged level variables from second lag onwards are valid
instruments and for equation in level first lag of the endogenous variable
in difference is valid instrument.  In our estimation, we consider all
explanatory variables as endogenous and therefore instrument them.  The
results are reported in Table 13. The table shows that Sargan statistics
validates the over-identifying restrictions. The results on AR (2) suggests
the absence of second order correlation. and thereby implies the validity
of instruments used.
Table 13:    Regression results
Automotive   Chemicals   Electronics     Pharmaceuticals
(other than
    pharmaceuticals)
ln tf2 -0.0045(-0.017) 0.429(3.08)** -0.138(-0.59) 0.261(1.37)
ln sales 1.244 (2.93)** 0.470(1.78)* 0.816(1.93)** 0.394(1.10)
ln exports -0.0734(-2.92) -0.028(0.246) 0.091(0.624) 0.553(1.89)*
Constant -6.262 (-2.48)** -1.126(-0.703) -4.26(-1.55) -2.01(-1.08)
Sargan 30.12(0.181) 26.03(0.352) 23.34(0.50) 27.67(0.274)
AR (1) -1.362(0.173) -2.516(0.012) -1.678(0.093) -1.944(0.52)
AR (2) -1.699(0.089) -0.326(0.74) -0.01(0.992) -0.266(0.79)
Notes:   **  Significant at 10 per cent level; * Significant at 5 per cent
level
The following inferences can be drawn from the above exercise:
(i)  The elasticity of R&D expenditure with respect to tax foregone
as a result of the operation of the R&D tax incentive is less than unity for
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all the four industries, although it is significant only in the case of the
chemicals industry. In two of the industries, namely in automotive and
electronic industries the elasticity is even negative, although not
significant. From this the reasonable interpretation that is possible is
that tax incentive does not have any influence on R&D, excepting possibly
in the chemicals industry where it has some influence although even in
this case the change in R&D as a result of tax incentive is less than the
amount of tax foregone. This lack of significant relationship between
R&D and tax foregone can be rationalized by the fact that the tax subsidy
covers only a very small percentage share (on an average 6 per cent) of
R&D undertaken by the enterprises in the four broad industry groups.
This is indicated by the column on subsidy intensity in Table 12. So our
conclusion is that for tax incentive to be effective in raising R&D
expenditures it must form a significant portion of R&D investments by
an enterprise. It is not thus a determinant of R&D investments by
enterprises. In fact this result corroborates the results of innovation
surveys done in the context of such diverse countries such as Brazil and
South Africa where innovating firm did not find government funds for
innovation as an important instrument for financing their respective
innovation efforts. In the Indian case even though 150 per cent of
weighted deduction of R&D expenditure is allowed, the taxable income
the firm has is not much. For firms to benefit from this specific incentive,
their profit before tax has to be large. May be an incremental tax incentive
of the type followed in the US and other western countries is likely to be
more beneficial;
(ii) Sales (a proxy for size) is found to be a more important
determinant. This is in line with the Schumpeterian hypothesis that large
sized firms are able to devote more investments on R&D. Surprisingly
exports turned out to have positive and significant influence on R&D
only in the case of the pharmaceutical industry. The other two industries
are much more inward looking where the domestic market is more
important than the export one. In the case of the pharmaceutical industry
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much of the R&D is in the development of generic versions of known
drugs which are then exported. So exports act as an important fillip.
One of the most important conclusions that emanate from our study
is that tax  incentives are not that effective in raising R&D expenditures
because the amount of subsidy that the firm receives is not much. The
market itself, domestic sales and some cases exports are important
determinants for the enterprises to commit more resources to R&D. But
despite this the Union Budget for 2008-0910 has extended this tax
treatment of R&D to two more industries, namely the production of
seeds and the manufacture of agricultural implements. It may be that
public policy making in this area is not informed by sufficient empirical
exercises of this sort.
IV.  Conclusions: Our study has shown that there have been
improvements in the innovative output of Indian industry during the
recent period since economic liberalisation. However this has been
restricted to a few industries such as the pharmaceutical industry. India
has three different types of financial incentives for R&D: research grants
and loans, venture capital and tax incentives. Our analysis showed that
the pharmaceutical industry has been a target of most of these financial
incentives. There is thus a fine targeting of innovation financing in India.
We endeavoured to estimate the coefficient of elasticity of R&D with
respect to tax foregone as result of this incentive scheme. The resulting
exercise showed that R&D expenditure of the concerned industries was
inelastic. We also found that the incentives did not form a significant
portion of R&D. It is therefore not prudent to make any comments on
the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives. But we see that the size of the
firm does appear to be an important determinant of R&D, at least, in the
case of some of the industries. Allowing firms to become larger and
10 See the Budget Speech of Mr P.Chidambaram for 2008-9, http://
indiabudget.nic.in/ub2008-09/bs/speecha.htm, paragraph 168 (accessed on May
22, 2008).
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through that process of growth enabling them to become larger investors
in R&D may be a better policy than providing them directly with
subsidies. It is also that the total number of firms enjoying these incentives
is not too many. It remains to be seen whether this is due to any
bureaucratic delays or difficulties in the actual administration of this
incentive.
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